Kidder calls this a «right vs. right» dilemma. When evaluating alternatives, both policy options have both positive and negative elements. Good versus good is an ethical dilemma, while good versus evil is identified as a moral temptation (Kidder, 1996). The first part deepens the exchange between Kamm and his commentators, highlighting the questions raised by their debates on the stability of moral intuitions. The second part explains the design of two experiments I conducted in which survey respondents are asked about their moral intuitions about wagon scenarios that contain random information about what the law says. The first experiment follows the standard trolley scenario, in which a spectator stands at the switch. The law criminalizes or justifies turning the car in different ways. The second replaces the viewer with a railway engineer, whose official role includes legally regulated tasks. By varying what the law says, these experiments together explore the role of the law – and the law of roles in particular – in shaping our moral intuitions.
Advocates of dilemmas need not deny all relevant principles. If you think that each of the principles has at least initial plausibility, then you will be inclined to keep as many as possible. Among previous contributions to this debate, some have taken the existence of dilemmas as a counterexample to the implicit «should» «may» (e.g., Lemmon 1962 and Trigg 1971); others, as a refutation of the agglomeration principle (e.g. Williams 1965 and van Fraassen 1973). A common response to the first argument is the rejection of the RFP. A more complicated answer is to admit that crucial deontic principles apply, but only in ideal worlds. In the real world, they have heuristic value by asking agents to look for permissible options in the event of a conflict, even if none may exist (Holbo 2002, especially sections 15-17). With a focus on values, the National Federation of Social Workers has created a framework used by social workers to resolve ethical dilemmas. The framework consists of six steps:[1] In international politics, sovereigns must navigate an increasingly fragmented set of overlapping institutional rules. The notion of a legal dilemma takes into account the factual legal uncertainty that international decision-makers regularly face. Jeutner`s suggestion to deal with such legal dilemmas makes a fruitful contribution to the ongoing interdisciplinary discussion on regime complexes and legal fragmentation.
As Jeutner puts it, the concept of a legal dilemma shifts «attention from conventional attempts to find the right answer at all costs» to «more productive and concerted efforts to find creative solutions to extremely difficult problems.» Opponents of moral dilemmas have generally argued that the crucial principles of the above two arguments are conceptually true, and so we must deny the possibility of real dilemmas. (See, for example, Conee 1982 and Zimmerman 1996.) Most of the debate, on all sides, has focused on the second argument. However, this is strange. When one examines the relevant principles of each argument which, combined with dilemmas, create inconsistencies, there is little doubt that those of the first argument claim to be more conceptually true than those of the second. (The one who acknowledges the importance of the first argument is Brink 1994, section V.) Perhaps the emphasis on the second argument is due to the impact of Bernard Williams` influential essay (Williams 1965). Note, however, that the first argument shows that if there are real dilemmas, PC or need to be abandoned. Even most proponents of dilemmas acknowledge that the PC is quite simple. E.J. Lemmon, for example, argues that if PC does not fit into a system of deontic logic, only truisms and paradoxes remain (Lemmon 1965, p. 51). And to ditch the PC, you also need to reject OP or D, which also seem basic.
There has been a lot of discussion about PD – especially the issues raised by the Good Samaritan paradox – but it still seems fundamental. So if you want to argue against purely conceptual dilemmas, you`d better focus on the first of the two arguments mentioned above. Second, as Simon Blackburn argues, compensation or similar compensation can be claimed even if there was no moral conflict (Blackburn 1996, 135-136). If a coach rightly chooses Agnes for the team over Belinda, she will likely talk to Belinda again, encouraging her efforts and offering advice on how to improve. This kind of «makeup» is just basic decency. Another distinction exists between dilemmas related to obligations and dilemmas related to prohibition. The former are situations where more than one feasible action is mandatory. The latter are cases in which all feasible actions are prohibited. Some (notably Valentyne 1987 and 1989) argue that plausible principles of deontic logic can make engagement dilemmas impossible; But they do not rule out the possibility of prohibition dilemmas. The case of Sartre`s pupil, if it is really dilemmatic, is a dilemma of obligation; Sophie`s case is a dilemma of prohibition. There is another reason why friends of dilemmas insist on this distinction. Some believe that the «disjunctive solution» used by opponents of dilemmas – when such strong commandments conflict with each other, the agent is asked to respond to one or the other – is more plausible when applied to dilemmas of commitment than when applied to dilemmas of prohibition.
If the examples of Plato and Sartre are the most frequently cited, there are many others. The literature is rich in such cases. In Aeschylus` Agamemnon, the protagonist was supposed to save his daughter and lead the Greek troops to Troy; He should do both, but he can`t do both. And Antigonus, in Sophocles` play of the same name, was to arrange the funeral of her brother Polynices and obey the declarations of the ruler of the city Creon; She can do any of these things, but not both. Areas of applied ethics, such as biomedical ethics, business ethics, and legal ethics, are also replete with such cases. Another issue that raises the question of moral dilemmas is the relationship between the different parts of morality. Consider this distinction. General obligations are moral requirements that individuals have simply because they are moral actors. That agents are obliged not to kill, not to steal and not to attack are examples of general obligations.
Only free will makes these commandments applicable to individuals. In contrast, role-based obligations are moral requirements that agents have because of their role, profession or position in society. That rescuers be obliged to rescue swimmers in distress is a role-related obligation. Another example that has already been mentioned is the obligation of a defence lawyer to keep a client`s disclosures confidential. These categories do not need to be exclusive. It is likely that anyone who can do this should save a drowning person. And if one person has particularly sensitive information about another, they probably shouldn`t share it with third parties, regardless of how the information was obtained. But lifeguards have a duty to help swimmers in need while most others do not because of their skills and contractual obligations. And lawyers have special confidentiality obligations to their clients due to implicit promises and the need to maintain trust. At this moment of particular vitality for the classical thought experiment, I would like to address a topic that current debates have tended to overlook: can our intuitions about moral dilemmas be influenced by the presence of the law? In the context of issues raised by the possibility of moral dilemmas, the role of the political actor is most often discussed.
Michael Walzer (1973) argues that the political leader, as a political leader, should do his best for the state; This is his most important task related to the role. But it must also respect the general obligations incumbent on everyone. Sometimes the obligations associated with the role of the political actor require him to do evil, that is, to violate certain general obligations. Among the examples cited by Walzer are an agreement with a dishonest community leader (necessary to get elected so he can do good) and allowing a person to be tortured to uncover a plan to blow up a public building. Since each of these requirements is binding, Walzer believes that the politician faces a real moral dilemma, although, curiously, he also thinks that the politician should choose the good of the community rather than adhere to general moral norms. (The question here is whether proponents of dilemmas can talk meaningfully about acting in truly dilemmatic situations. For someone who agrees, see Tessman 2015, especially Chapter 5.) Such a situation is sometimes referred to as the «dirty hands problem.» The expression «dirty hands» comes from the title of a play by Sartre (1946). The idea is that no one can govern without being morally tainted.
The role itself is fraught with moral dilemmas. This topic has received a lot of attention recently. John Parrish (2007) provided a detailed history of how philosophers, from Plato to Adam Smith, have dealt with the subject. He is the son of C.A.J. Coady (2008) suggested that this reveals a «chaotic morality». In Book I of Plato`s Republic, Cephalus defines «justice» as telling the truth and paying one`s debts. Socrates is quick to refute this account by suggesting that it would be wrong to pay off certain debts – for example, returning a weapon borrowed from an unsane friend. Socrates` view is not that debt repayment is devoid of moral significance; Rather, he wants to show that it is not always fair to repay debts, at least not when the person to whom the debt is owed asks for repayment.