Bulgarian is the only official language in Bulgaria. [21] The pro-English website U.S. English considers a multilingual government to be one in which its «services actually promote the growth of linguistic enclaves. [and] contributes to racial and ethnic conflicts.» [46] Opponents of the official languages policy in the United States argue that it would «impair the government`s ability to assist people in the event of a natural or man-made disaster, such as a hurricane, pandemic or […] another terrorist attack.» [43] Political science professor Alan Patten argues that withdrawal (officially ignoring the issue) works well on religious issues, but is not possible on language issues because it must provide public services in a particular language. Even if it makes a conscious effort not to establish an official language, a de facto official language or the «national language» will emerge. [14] In fact, two-thirds of Americans believe that English is the official language of the United States. [47] This approach is not only simpler; it fills the void left by Hart in his theory. According to Hart, the meaning of normative language differs in morality and law. But in fact, Hart had nothing to say about the meaning of normative expressions such as «should» and «must» or «obligation» or «right» (except that their meaning is different in law and morality). He only pointed out that people show an attitude when they use such language.
We should conclude that it is not only possible for an authority or a person to legislate through the use of language; It is a central technique of the legal system (and the rule of law) that the law gives individuals and authorities the power to enact certain legal norms and general rules of law. The reasons of political morality for this are indeed a valid reason for the content of the law, although the techniques that allow an effective distribution of legal power are also suitable for abuses. And the moral value of the attribution of legal power and its potential for abuse both depend on human language: the most surprisingly useful tools for articulating politics and for transferring and exercising power. 178 countries recognize an official language, of which 101 recognize more than one. The Italian government did not formalize Italian until 1999,[4] and some countries (such as the United States, Mexico and Australia) have never de jure declared the official languages at the national level. [5] Other nations reported non-Indigenous official languages. Legal philosophers have tried to explain the normativity of law – the fact that the law of a community is, or presents itself as, a guide to the behavior of the members of a community. A simple way to express this abstract feature of the right is to emphasize that the right can be expressed through normative statements (i.e., statements that use phrases such as «obligation,» «right,» «shall,» «may»). And an attractive way to explain the normativity of law is to explain the meaning and use of normative language, which is often used in the formulation of law. That is, the problem of explaining the nature of legal norms (duties, rights, etc.) can be solved by explaining the meaning or use of normative words used in law («obligation», «law», ,…). Joseph Raz put it this way: «The problem of the normativity of law is the problem of explaining the use of normative language in the description of law or legal situations.» (1990, 170) Hart`s approach to language was different.
It may seem that he did not need to speak a language and that his point of view could have been made without mentioning the types of claims or what «we would say». His argument, one might think, simply puts in linguistic mode an argument that could be advanced without mentioning language: an argument according to which one can have an obligation without being sanctioned. And yet, the linguistic form of the argument was important to Hart. He wanted to avoid explaining the difference between obligation and coercion as a natural law theorist would (by saying that an obligation is a kind of reason). His emphasis on the use of the word «obligation» is therefore no coincidence. He did not emphasize how we use this word as an oblique way of appealing to our common wisdom, which is obligation. It was actually important for him to emphasize how we use the word. His explanation of the normativity of law is based on the use of such words to show an attitude. Legal theorists have attempted to construct theories about the importance of legal language and theories of legal interpretation based on specific features of law, legal systems, and the use of language in legal education.
The entries on constitutionalism (see Section 7, «Constitutional Interpretation»), on interpretation and consistency in the explanatory memorandum of law, on legal interpretation, on the system of legal interpretation, on the nature of law, and on naturalism in the philosophy of law all deal with theories of legal interpretation. This section discusses the characteristics of language that pose challenges to the philosophy of law and the philosophy of language. Any good presentation of the legal effect of the use of language in legislation depends on the context of its use (which will be discussed in this section). Section 2.3 discusses the «pragmatic» effects of language use, such as contextual dependence, which have long been the subject of legal debate; More recently, the use of Greek and post-Gricean pragmatics has become an important field of discussion among philosophers of language and philosophers of law. These pragmatic features of communication pose insurmountable difficulties for any attempt to give a truthful account of legal interpretation sufficiently well organized to be called «theory». Debates on the pragmatics of legal language are often based on the idea that a legislator`s linguistic use means that the content of the linguistic communication in question determines the content of the law. But we will see in section 3 that even this premise is disputed; It has been challenged by theorists who consider that law is determined by moral reasons to draw conclusions about people`s rights, duties, powers, and responsibilities in the face of the facts of legal practice and history. In legal memoirs, Anglo-Norman developed into legal French, from which many words of modern legal English are derived. This includes property, estates, personal property, leases, executors and tenants. The use of French Law during this period had a lasting influence on the general linguistic register of modern legal English. This usage also explains some of the complex linguistic structures used in legal drafting.
In 1362, the Plea Statute was published, stipulating that all trials should be conducted in English (but Latin). This marked the beginning of formal legal English; French law was used in some forms until the 17th century, although French law was increasingly degenerate. Hart began by arguing that Bentham and Austin had explained the meaning and use of normative language in a way that did not take into account their role in ordinary speech. He pointed out that their presentation of the meaning of the word «duty» did not allow them to make a distinction that people usually make in their language between the command of a shooter (which no one would say imposes a «duty» or «obligation») and a legal requirement: But Dworkin would probably have expanded his «semantic sting» argument into an argument. that the communication model suffers from a «semantic and pragmatic sting», i.e. the misconception that the content of the law is determined by agreement both in terms of word semantics and in terms of the pragmatics of communication. He would no doubt have said that the only antidote to this sting is his theory of «constructive interpretation,» which asserts that the «pragmatic» aspects of language use in law include the attitude that the law must justify the use of state coercion, which obliges the interpreter to construct and justifies the theory of rights and duties that best fits and justifies the overall legal practice. This was Dworkin`s essential claim.