36. For example, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (deterrence is the main, if not the only, purpose of the rule.); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347–48 (1974); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536–39 (1975); Stein v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 n.3, 137–38 (1978); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979). Thus, admitting the fruits of an unlawful search or seizure is not a new wrong under the Fourth Amendment, since the injustice is entirely achieved by the unlawful search or seizure itself, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S., at p. 354, and that the exclusionary rule does not remedy the interference with the defendant`s rights that he has already suffered. Stein v. Powell, 428 U.S. to 540 (White J.
dissenting). The integrity of the judiciary is not violated by the mere admission of illegally seized evidence. The courts cannot commit or encourage violations of the Constitution, and the question of integrity is resolved by whether excluding violations by others would deter them. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. to 458 n.35; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347, 354; United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 538; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 450 n.25 (1974). Until the independence of the United States, English courts excluded self-incriminating evidence presented by official coercion, regardless of its reliability. [4] In 1769, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield stated: The exclusion rule does not apply to revocation hearings,45FootnotePennsylvania Vol. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998). and a violation of the «hit and announce» rule (the procedure police officers must follow to announce their presence before entering a home with a lawful warrant).46 FootnoteFootnote The striking and announcing requirement is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3109, and the court held that the rule is also part of the Fourth Amendment adequacy study.
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). does not require the removal of evidence gathered during a search47FootnoteHudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, stating that the exclusionary rule was inappropriate because the purpose of the requirement to strike and announce was to protect human life, property, and the privacy and dignity of the owner; This requirement has never protected a person`s interest in preventing the seizure of evidence described in an arrest warrant. Id., p. 594. In addition, the Court considered that the significant social costs of applying the exclusionary rule would outweigh the benefits of deterring infringements through its application.
The Court also held that other deterrents, such as civil remedies, were available and effective, and that police forces had become increasingly professional and respected constitutional rights over the past half-century. Id., p. 599. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he emphasized the continued application of the exclusion rule. There is no doubt about it. Id., p. 603. In contrast, Justice Breyer asserted that the majority`s decision weakened, if not destroyed, much of the practical value of protecting the Constitution.
Id., p. 605. If an arrest or search that was valid at the time it was made is rendered ill by the subsequent repeal of the law under which the arrest or search was made, the Court held that the evidence thus obtained is nevertheless admissible.48FootnoteMichigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (Creation of a Material Crime Act). However, laws that permit unconstitutional search and seizure, but have not yet been repealed at the time of the search or seizure, may not have this effect, Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
This aspect of Torres and Ybarra was largely reinforced by Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), which rejects a distinction between substantive and procedural law and considers that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable where a police officer objectively reasonably invokes a law that was subsequently found to be contrary to the Fourth Amendment. Similarly, the exclusionary rule does not require the suppression of evidence seized in connection with an arrest resulting from a clerical error committed by a registrar. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). In other cases, a grand jury witness had to answer questions, even if they were based on evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure,49 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
and federal tax authorities have been allowed to use evidence unconstitutionally seized by state authorities from a defendant in civil proceedings.50FootnoteUnited States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Similarly, the rule does not apply in civil proceedings for the expulsion of aliens. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). For example, it is not clear from the Court`s analysis in Leon and its descendants whether a majority of judges would also support a bona fide exception for evidence seized without a warrant, even though there is broad language to be applied to seizures without warrants.63 The analysis in Leon focused on the appropriateness of relying on an Arrest Warrant. However, the Court has repeatedly used language broad enough to apply to warrantless searches.
See, for example, 468 U.S. at 909 (citing Justice White`s approval in Illinois v. Gates): the balanced approach that has evolved. «strongly proposes that the exclusionary rule be amended more generally to allow for the introduction of evidence obtained in good faith that a search or seizure was in accordance with the Fourth Amendment»; et al., at p. 919: [The rule cannot be expected] and should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable enforcement action. Nor is it clear what a bona fide exception would mean in the context of a warrantless search, since the objectively reasonableness of a public servant`s actions in an unwarranted trial is already taken into account in determining whether there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment.64FootnoteSee Yale Kamisar, Gates, «Probable Cause,» «Good Faith» and Beyond, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 551, 589 (1984) (imposing a bona fide exemption on top of the already watered-down standard for the validity of a warrant would amount to double dilution).
However, the court`s growing willingness to maintain warrantless searches as not inappropriate under the Fourth Amendment may reduce the frequency with which the question of good faith arises in the context of the exclusionary rule.65FootnoteSee e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (maintaining the search on the basis of the officer`s reasonable but erroneous assumption that a third party had joint authority over the premises and could consent to the search); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (no requirement for knowingly and intelligently waiving consent to warrantless search); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (searching the entire interior of a passenger car, including closed containers, without warrant as a driver arrest incident); Arizona v. Glove, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (the Belton Rule applies only if the inmate is within range of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or if there is reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (Search of mobile container found in locked safe confirmed without court order).
The exclusionary rule does not prevent the government from introducing illegally collected evidence to indict defendants` statements in court or to attack credibility. The Supreme Court recognized this exception in Harris v. New York as a litmus test to prevent perjury. However, even if the government suspects perjury, it can only use tainted evidence for impeachment and cannot use it to prove guilt. 41. For example, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993) (only persons whose rights to privacy or property are violated may object to a search on Fourth Amendment grounds; the exercise of control and surveillance of property on the basis of participation in a criminal conspiracy does not in itself create such interests); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). In United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), the Court held that it was impermissible for a federal court to exercise its power to oversee the administration of justice in the federal system to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the basis that federal officials had flagrantly violated the rights of third parties under the Fourth Amendment in order to obtain evidence for others. if the officers knew that the defendant could not challenge their conduct under the Fourth Amendment. The exclusion of evidence as a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment began in Boyd v.